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Abstract 
We combine the resource curse literature with the literature on cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) to investigate two hypotheses, namely (i) countries with a 
comparative advantage in natural resources attract more M&As in natural resource 
intensive sectors and (ii) countries with a high natural resource dependency attract fewer 
M&As in other sectors. Using the Thomson dataset we test these hypotheses for a 
sample of 49 African and Latin American countries in the period 1988 - 2007. Both 
hypotheses were confirmed by our findings. Thus, resource dependency has a 
“crowding out” effect on M&As in sectors not intensive in natural resources, and a 
comparative advantage in natural resources has a “crowding in” effect on M&As in 
sectors intensive in natural resources. 
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1 Introduction 
The rapid increase of foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) flows in the past 20 
year has sparked a growing interest in the literature and in the policy field to better 
understand the determinants and impact of these flows. Remarkably, not many studies 
focus on the most important component of FDI flows for developing countries: cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (henceforth M&As).1 This lack of interest in 
developing countries might be caused by the small role they play either as a target or as 
acquirer of M&As (see Unctad, WIR 2007). As a share of GDP, however, the role of 
M&As for many developing nations is comparable to that of many developed nations. 
This is illustrated for Africa and Latin America in comparison to a selection of OECD 
nations in Figure 1 for the period 2001-2006, both from an acquiring and target 
perspective.2 In 2006, for example, from a target perspective M&As relative to GDP 
were 3.4% for Latin America and 2.4% for Africa, which is higher for both regions than 
for Germany (2.3%), Spain (2.2%), or the United States (2.2%). As acquirers, Latin 
American and African economies still lag behind in M&A deals (Figure 1b). In 2006, 
acquiring M&As relative to GDP did not reach 1% for either region, compared to, for 
example, 4.7% for France.  
 
We analyze the determinants of M&As for Africa and Latin America using recent 
empirical and theoretical developments in the literature. We focus attention on the role 
of natural resources3 as a driving force of M&As in trying to resolve a piece of the 
‘natural resource puzzle’. The effect of natural resources on FDI is one of the channels 
between natural resources and economic growth. Nonetheless, the direction of this 
effect is ambiguous in the empirical literature (see section 2a).   
 
                                                 
1
 The share of M&As in FDI varies from year to year around 70-80%, see Brakman, Garretsen, and van 
Marrewijk (2007). 
2
 Included African countries: Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Included Latin American countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
3
 Throughout this paper when we refer to natural resources we are also considering primary goods. 
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Figure 1 – Mergers and acquisitions relative to GDP, 2001- 2006 
 
Source: Own calculations; based on data from Unctad - WIR(2007), and IMF - WEO2007. 
 
Additionally, the relation among ‘natural resources’ and FDI for developing countries is 
relevant from a policy point of view. FDI has a positive role on economic performance, 
which has been extensively discussed in the literature (Borensztein, de Gregorio and 
Lee, 1998; Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter, 2007; Hausmann and Fernández-Arias, 
2000).4 In particular, FDI could be an important source of diversification of economic 
activities, helping the rich resource economies become less dependent on only one or a 
few commodities to generate their growth.5 The diversification can create linkages and 
spillovers with other sectors of the economy, stimulating the growth and development 
of the nations receiving FDI flows. 
  
                                                 
4
 Evenett (2003) explores specifically the economic impact of M&As. He shows that theoretically it is not 
clear whether this economic impact will necessarily be positive. Consumers benefit with the reduction in 
prices and increase in the variety and quality of products as a result of economies of scale and scope 
brought by M&As. However, this is counterbalanced by the increase in market power from the firms, 
which has a negative anticompetitive effect. 
5
 Dependence on a few commodities is one of the explanations for the resource curse. Volatility of 
commodity prices can generate cycles of raising or decreasing revenues because natural resources have a 
low price elasticity of supply. Moreover, this dependency can lead to lower growth due to the voracity 
effect. An increase in the price of a common stock of resources can lead to rent seeking as opposed to 
investment (van der Ploeg, 2006). 
3 
More generally, understanding the role played by natural resources on M&A inflows in 
developing countries is insightful. Sectors such as metal mining are notably the main 
attractors of M&As to Latin America and Africa (see section 4 for details). Moreover, it 
is an ongoing debate in the resource curse literature, to be discussed in section 2a. 
 
Furthermore, we are motivated by the contradictory results encountered in the empirical 
literature in relation to the impact of ‘natural resources’ on FDI. A few papers (see 
section 2a) show that ‘natural resources’ have a positive influence on FDI inflows. 
However, Gylfason (2004) findings show a negative influence. A reason for this lack of 
consensus is an aggregation problem. Therefore, we will disaggregate the data in sectors 
intensive in natural resources and sectors not intensive in natural resources. We expect 
to find a different coefficient for what we, so far, generally termed ‘natural resources’. 
This will depend on first: the measure used for ‘natural resources’ and secondly on the 
sector disaggregation. Specifically, we test two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Countries with a comparative advantage in natural resources, ceteris 
paribus attract more M&As in sectors intensive in natural resources. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Countries with a high dependency in natural resources, ceteris paribus 
attract fewer M&As in other sectors. 
 
We base the first hypothesis on the fact that M&As are more likely to occur in sectors 
where the target country has a comparative advantage.6 Many developing countries have 
a comparative advantage in natural resources, which, e.g., can be measured by natural 
resource abundance. Therefore, we expect wealthier countries in natural resources to 
attract more M&As within sectors that use these resources intensively. The second 
hypothesis is motivated by theoretical findings from the resource curse literature. These 
theoretical findings associate resource dependency with external market instability. The 
external market instability causes a  negative effect on FDI inflows. We will discuss 
both aspects in more detail in the next section.  
 
                                                 
6
 As we will discuss later Brakman et al. (2008) show that M&As towards target countries are directed to 
the sectors where the countries have a high comparative advantage. 
4 
To test the two hypotheses we base our econometric analysis on a gravity model 
specification. Using a zero-inflated model we compare three regressions: first with all 
the data; second with data restricted to M&As in natural resource intensive sectors; and 
third with data restricted to M&As in sectors not intensive in natural resources. We give 
special attention to ‘natural resources’ as a determinant of M&As.  
    
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an 
overview on the resource curse literature and on the current literature on FDI, focusing 
on M&As. Section 3 deals with the empirical model specification,  description of the 
variables used and the econometric methodology. In Section 4 the data base on M&As 
is discussed and we present descriptive statistics. Section 5 covers the estimation results 
and robustness checks. In Section VI concluding remarks are given. 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
2a Resource Curse 
There are many examples of natural resource rich countries which have not benefited 
from their wealth in terms of economic development. Oil-rich Nigeria, for example, has 
a stagnating income per capita level since 1970, while the poverty rate has increased 
from 36 percent in 1970 to 70 percent in 2000. In this period the number of poor people 
has risen from roughly 19 to 90 million (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Similar 
experiences were discussed in the literature. This phenomena is referred to as the 
‘resource curse’.7 There is, however, no agreement as to whether natural resource 
abundance is indeed a curse. There are countries, e.g., Botswana and Norway, that have 
made good use of their natural resource wealth. These different experiences are the 
result of many channels through which natural wealth affects growth and development. 
 
The different channels from natural wealth to growth imply that the income generated 
by natural resources does not necessarily result in positive growth. Growth will only 
result if the wealthy country in natural resources adopts policies to manage its income in 
a productive and efficient manner. A healthy environment for good policies is therefore 
necessary. Good institutions, existence of reliable rule of law and transparency are a few 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Mehlum et al. (2006), Robinson et al. (2006), and Gylfason (2004). 
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conditions for a ‘resource blessing’ (van der Ploeg, 2006). In other words, natural 
resource abundance does not determine per se the economic benefits or harms that it 
will bring. The overall result is determined by the use made of these resources and by 
the implications of these actions on other economic activities. Therefore, although there 
is disagreement over the benefits/ harms of natural wealth, there is evidence that 
institutional quality and trade openness, for example, improve the chances of a resource 
blessing instead of a curse (van der Ploeg, 2006). 
 
Gylfason (2004) discusses five channels of transmission from natural resource 
abundance to economic growth, being one of them the “Dutch disease and foreign 
capital”. This is the channel we focus on this research. Given the considerable 
fluctuation of raw materials prices, countries with a higher export dependency on 
natural resources are more inclined to suffer from exchange rate volatility. This creates 
uncertainty in the external market not only for trade but also for foreign investment.  
 
In support of the “Dutch disease and foreign capital” channel, Poelhekke and van der 
Ploeg (2007) show that volatility is one of the most important channels through which 
natural resources affect growth in a negative way. An important point of this argument 
is that it is not natural resource abundance that tends to generate more volatility, but the 
dependence on natural resource revenues. Moreover, Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 
(2007) indicate that countries that experience more volatility of commodity prices 
receive less FDI.  
 
Based on these perspectives, we expect natural resource dependency to have a negative 
impact on FDI inflows. This result motivates our hypothesis that countries which are 
more dependent on natural resources experience fewer inflows of M&As into sectors 
not intensive in natural resources (such as manufactures and services). We restrict our 
hypothesis to these sectors because the negative impact of natural resource dependency 
on FDI can be absent in sectors intensive in natural resources. Hence, despite the 
volatility in prices, foreigner investors still invest in sectors intensive in natural 
resources, if the target country has a comparative advantage in those sectors. 
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In general, literature on the analysis of the determinants of FDI (particularly, M&As), 
e.g., di Giovanni, 2005; Hijzen et al., 2008; Brakman et al., 2008, do not consider 
natural resources as a factor that may drive such flows. Common regressors are size of 
the domestic market, distance between the home and target market and institutional 
variables (such as financial and trade openness). Studies that take into account ‘natural 
resources’ (Asiedu, 2003; Deichmann et al, 2003; Onyeiwu and Shrestha, 2004) do not 
make a distinction between the sectors to which the investment flows are directed. 
 
Moreover, the empirical literature that controls for ‘natural resources’ show both a 
negative and a positive impact of ‘natural resources’ on FDI inflows. Onyeiwu and 
Shrestha, 2004; Deichamn et al., 2003 and Jensen, 2003 found a positive coefficient for 
‘natural resources’. Onyeiwu and Shrestha (2004) use a panel data for 29 African 
countries between 1975 and 1999 to analyze the determinants of FDI. The authors 
measure natural resource availability by the percentage of fuel exports to total exports. 
Onyeiwu and Shrestha findings show a positive and significant link between this natural 
resource availability variable and FDI. 
 
Deichmann et al. (2003) analyze the determinants of FDI for Eurasia transition 
economies. In particular Deichmann et al. assess the impact of resource scarcity on the 
value of FDI per capita. Resource scarcity is measured via an index. The index equals 0 
if a country is poor in natural resources, 1 if it is moderate and 2 if rich. The availability 
of this index is restricted to a few transition economies (see de Melo et al., 1997). This 
index measures the diversity of natural resources in a country. Thus the index captures 
whether self sufficiency in natural resources favours the attraction of FDI. Deichmann 
et al. show that resource scarcity has a negative effect on FDI. 
 
A more comprehensive study was performed by Jensen (2003) who used both cross-
sectional and panel regressions analysis to analyze the forces of attraction of FDI for 
114 countries. Although the focus of Jensen’s paper is on the relationship between 
democratic governance and inflows of FDI, natural resource dependency is also used as 
a control variable. Their study showed that natural resource dependency has a positive 
and significant impact on FDI. 
7 
The abovementioned studies show that natural resources have a positive influence on 
FDI. The definition of ‘natural resources’, however, varies per study, making it difficult 
to compare the results. Moreover, none of these papers use a gravity model approach, a 
standard framework to measure inflows of FDI. They also do not discuss the many zero 
observations associated with FDI. The non-inclusion of zero values is a common 
mistake in empirical work. Alternative methods are available to take this data into 
consideration. It relies on a gravity model approach (see Silva and Tenreyro, 2006 and 
Garita and van Marrewijk, 2008). 
 
Gylfason (2004), on the other hand, shows that increased dependency on natural 
resources has a negative effect on FDI inflows.  Considering the Arab world experience, 
Gylfason shows that natural capital “crowds out” foreign capital. In addition, for a 
sample of 85 countries, Gylfason findings show that being rich in natural resources has 
a negative impact on openness to FDI.  
 
The lack of consensus in the literature can be explained by three major elements. First, 
there is a loose interpretation and use of the term “natural resource abundance”. The 
resource dependency variable (measured by the ratio of primary exports to total exports) 
is not a perfect proxy for natural resource abundance (Brunnschweiler, 2008). 
Moreover, a few studies not only use exports of natural resources as a proxy for natural 
resources abundance, as they also restrict the measure to oil exports or mineral exports. 
The problem in using resource dependency is to then claim an association between 
natural resources abundance and FDI. The correct conclusion is, instead, between 
resource dependency and FDI (as we will show, this is the case for M&As in sectors not 
intensive in natural resources).8 Therefore, care must be taken in the use and 
interpretation of the chosen variable.  
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 Given our sample of countries we compare the measure of natural wealth from the World Bank 
(unpublished estimates) with the measure of resource dependency used in our estimation procedure. The 
correlation between these two variables turned out to be low. If we take the level of natural wealth, the 
correlation with resource dependency is 0.08 (for the year 2000). A closer look at the data makes it 
evident that there is no straightforward connection between them: there are countries very rich in natural 
resources with a low resource dependency (Brazil, for example), and countries relatively less rich in 
natural resources but highly dependent on exports of natural resources (ex: Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana). The 
correlation is higher if we consider natural wealth per capita instead, 0.23. Still, the measures are not 
interchangeable, and the interpretation of the results has to be consistent with the measure used. 
8 
A second reason for the lack of consensus in the literature is, as we have already noted, 
the non-inclusion of the zero-values flows of FDI. The fact that two countries have no 
flows of FDI is an important information, and should not be excluded from the dataset. 
This exclusion bias the results. 
 
Finally, the most important reason that explains the different results for ‘natural 
resources’ as a determinant of FDI is the aggregation of the data. To the best of our 
knowledge the present paper is the first to disaggregate the data into natural resource 
intensive sectors and non intensive in natural resources sectors to explore the 
determinants of M&As. The disaggregation of the data shows that resource dependency 
and natural wealth have different effects on M&As inflows (see section 5). The result 
depends on the sector of the target firm. 
 
2b Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions 
International trade economists have linked the theory on multinationals with the 
international trade theory. These economists analyze a firm’s motivation to serve a 
foreign market via foreign production or via exports. There are disadvantages (e.g. 
language and customs differences and legal and institutional costs) and advantages 
(ownership, location, and internalization) with producing in a foreign country. The three 
advantages just mentioned were proposed by Dunning; the O.L.I. framework. These 
advantages motivate a firm to serve a foreign country through direct investment instead 
of trade (see Markusen, 1995 for an overview). 
  
The O.L.I. framework provides two options for the firm: exports or direct investments. 
There are, however, other options available to the firm, such as licensing and joint 
venture. Additionally, FDI is broadly divided into two categories: greenfield 
investments and M&As. The latter constitutes the biggest share of total FDI (Brakman 
et al., 2008). The predominance of M&As flows has led to the recent development of a 
strand in the literature particularly concerned with the explanation of the determinants 
of M&As. According to Neary (2007), the Industrial Organization (I.O.) literature 
proposes that mergers are motivated by efficiency gains. These gains are a consequence, 
for example, of technological transfer and managerial synergies. A second motive for 
9 
mergers is a strategic one, by changing the market structure. A merger or acquisition 
implies the removal of a competitor from the market, resulting in a profit increase for 
the remaining firms. The strategic motive has been illustrated under a Cournot 
competition model (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990 and Perry and Porter, 1985). Is it shown 
that under such a model mergers may arise as the best outcome. 
 
The drawback of such analyzes is their partial equilibrium framework, which excludes 
the interaction between markets, such as good and factor markets. Neary (2007) made a 
major contribution by combining elements from the I.O. literature into the theory of 
international trade. The author builds an oligopoly model in a general equilibrium 
framework (GOLE model). One of the important elements from this approach is the 
possibility of analyzing how trade patterns influence M&As flows. 
 
In the GOLE model, differences in costs between home and foreign firms and the 
number of firms in the target and the acquirer countries, determine whether there is a 
gain in conducting a merger. If the profit of the acquiring firm is higher than the initial 
(pre-merger) profits of both the target and the acquiring firms then merging is the best 
strategy for the acquiring firm. Moreover, a merger implies the taking over of the target 
firm, resulting in a reduction of the number of firms in the market and in an incentive 
for further takeovers. Thus, another important element from this approach is the 
theoretical foundation for M&A waves.  
 
M&A waves are an empirically verifiable fact. Either taking the number of deals or the 
value of deals a simple plot by time shows periods of increasing M&As and periods of 
decreasing M&As (see for an illustration Brakman et al., 2007). In the 20th century there 
were five merger waves, with the last case occurring between 1995 and 2000. With our 
particular dataset, covering the periods 1988 until 2007 three waves are present: the end 
of the fourth wave (1988-1990), the fifth wave (1995-2000) and the sixth wave, which 
started in 2003.9 
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 In addition to the existence of waves it is also a stylized fact that the scale of M&As are much larger in 
more recent waves than in previous one (Evenett, 2003 compares the wave from the 90s with the one 
from the 80s, showing that the latest is about five times larger in real terms than its predecessor). 
10 
Figure 2 – Distribution of number and value of M&As between the five most active 
target countries in Latin America and Africa. 
 
 
For the data we collected (see section 4 for details), the majority of M&As towards 
Latin America and Africa, either in terms of number or in terms of value of the deals, is 
concentrated in a few countries, notably, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, South Africa and 
Chile. For these five countries (see Figure 2) M&As inflows are increasing in the period 
starting around 1995 until 2001. After 2001, there is a decline of M&As inflows, with a 
subsequent increase in more recent years, around 2005. This pattern gives an indication 
of the waves reported in the recent theory of M&As. It is also in accordance to the wave 
periods described by Brakman et al. (2007). 
 
Brakman, Garretsen et al. (2008) test two implications of Neary’s model for five OECD 
countries. First, they test whether differences in cost affect individual cross-border 
M&As. Neary’s model implies that if a firm has a cost advantage, then it is profitable to 
merge with the highest cost firm. Brakman, Garretsen et al. use the Balassa index as a 
measure for cost advantage. For the case that the sample of countries is in the position 
of acquirers, the findings confirmed the theoretical prediction of Neary’s model. The 
authors find a positive relation between comparative advantage in a sector and the 
number of acquiring firms. 
 
When the countries are in the position of targets again the finding is that they are in 
sectors with a comparative advantage. The authors name the latter finding as the “target 
paradox”, which they explain by allowing firm heterogeneity in a multi-country 
extension of the GOLE model. This finding motivates our first hypothesis. Many Latin 
American and African countries have a comparative advantage in natural resources. 
11 
Therefore, the result from Brakman, Garretsen et al. (2008) indicates that these 
countries are expected to receive M&As in sectors that use natural resources 
intensively. 
 
The second implication of Neary’s model, which Brakman, Garretsen et al. (2008) test, 
is whether M&A waves help explain M&As. The authors find that either taking the five 
OECD countries as acquirers or as targets, there is a positive global wave effect of 
M&As. This confirms the findings in Neary’s model. 
 
In addition to Brakman, Garretsen et al. (2008), other authors (Di Giovani, 2005; Hijzen 
et al., 2008; Brakman, Garita et al., 2008 and Garita and van Marrewijk, 2008) use a 
gravity-type framework to analyze M&As flows. Di Giovani (2005) uses a gravity 
model to test the impact of financial markets deepness in the acquiring countries on 
M&As. By providing more opportunity of capital access to undertake investment 
projects, a deeper financial market would favour M&As flows. Although the author 
bases the analysis on the gravity model, by considering a log-linear form the inclusion 
of the zero flow values is not feasible.10 The problem is minimized by adopting a two 
stage Tobit model. An alternative is to include the zero observations in the estimation 
procedure (see section 3). 
 
Hijzen et al. (2008) adopt a gravity model to analyze the role of trade costs in 
determining M&As. The authors use data for 23 OECD countries and disaggregate the 
data by sectors. In particular, Hijzen et al. focus on manufacturing industries and 
separate the M&As between horizontal and non-horizontal at the 4-digit SIC code 
classification. The authors estimate the model through a negative binomial regression, 
an approach we will discuss later. This approach has the advantage of allowing the zero 
observations data and of controlling for possible dispersion in the data.  
 
Finally, two recent papers use the same econometric approach (zero-inflated model) as 
the one we adopt in this paper (Brakman, Garita et al. 2008; and Garita and van 
Marrewijk, 2008). Both papers analyze the determinants of M&As flows. The reason 
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 To overcome this problem some authors use ln(value+1) instead of ln(value) as the dependent variable 
in the Tobit estimations. However, this leads to inconsistent estimates (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). 
12 
for working with a zero-inflated model when dealing with M&As flows will become 
clearer in the next section. 
  
3 Empirical Model 
We base our empirical model in a gravity equation framework, originally introduced in 
Economics in the trade literature. The gravity equation can be derived from different 
models, such as Ricardian, Hechscher-Ohlin, and increasing returns to scale.11 In its 
simple form, the gravity model for trade states that trade flows among two countries is a 
function of the size of each country (measured in terms of GDP) and the distance among 
the countries. GDP of both countries affect trade flows positively, whereas distance is 
negatively proportional to trade flows. We can describe this simple form as: 
 
 
31 2
0ij i j ij ijT Y Y D
αα αα η= ,                          (1) 
 
where Tij is trade flows among country i and country j; Yi and Yj are GDP of country i 
and j, respectively, Dij is distance among the two countries, and  ηij is an error term. 
 
For the purpose of the research herein, we incorporate additional control variables from 
theoretical literature on M&As: wave and transaction cost. The latter variable is 
measured by a dummy of common language between target and acquirer countries, and 
by a dummy variable of past colonial relation between target and acquirer countries. We 
also incorporate in the model variables which are more broadly used in the empirical 
literature to explain the determinants of M&As: GDP per capita of target and acquirer 
countries and institutional variables. The latter encompasses three variables: 
transparency, trade openness and financial openness. Finally, we control for ‘natural 
resources’. We estimate whether ‘natural resources’ drive inflows of M&A, using 20 
years data for a set of countries from Latin America and Africa (see appendix A for a 
list with the countries names).  
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 See Evenett and Keller (2002) for a test on the theories in international trade that are behind the success 
of the gravity equation. 
13 
Considering these additional control variables, the gravity model for this research is as 
follows: 
     
3 5 6 7 8 9 101 2 4
( 1)0 ij tijrt it jt it jt ijt it it jt t ijtM Y Y Ypc Ypc D R C C C M
α α α α α α αα α αα η
−
= ,                 (2) 
 
where Mijrt refers to the number of M&As between countries i (target) and j (acquirer) 
and sector r at time t. Using this notation, we have considered above that M&As are not 
only a function of size of the countries, and distance among them, but also of the GDP 
per capita from the target (Ypci) and from the acquirer (Ypcj), control variables of the 
target country (Ci), control variables of the acquirer country (Cj), common control 
variables (Ct), a measure for natural resources (Ri) and previous global M&As (Mij(t-
1)).12  
 
The control variables for the target countries are: a transparency measure, ranging from 
0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean), a measure of trade openness and one of financial 
openness and dummies for regions.13 The control variables for the acquirer countries 
are: a measure of trade openness and one of financial openness and dummies for 
regions. The common control variables are: a dummy for common language between 
target and acquirer countries, a dummy for past colonial relation between target and 
acquirer countries and dummies for year.14 Appendix C describes the sources, definition 
and availability of the data. 
 
As for the measure of ‘natural resources’, we use two variables: natural resource 
dependency (measured as percentage of exports of natural resources to GDP) and 
natural wealth. We use the natural resource dependency measure to evaluate M&As in 
sectors not intensive in natural resources. The main reason for this choice is that we 
expect countries dependent on natural resources to receive less M&As in sectors that are 
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 The motivation to include a global wave variable in our regression model comes from the positive 
global wave effect of M&As found in Brakman, Garretsen et al. (2008), as predicted in Neary’s GOLE 
model. 
13
 Appendix B presents a list with the regions considered. 
14
 Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) show that the inclusion of national and year dummies can prevent bias 
estimates due to omission of terms in the estimation procedure which are part of the formal model of the 
gravity equation for trade flows. Due to our large number of acquirer countries, we have used instead 
dummy for regions to control for regional fixed effects. 
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not intensive in natural resources (see section 2a and Hypothesis 2). According to 
Gylfason (2004) and Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2007) if the weight of natural 
resources revenue on an economy is too high then this economy is much more 
vulnerable to changes in commodities prices, creating uncertainty for the investors. 
Therefore, following the literature on volatility of commodity prices and the Dutch 
disease, the measure of natural resource dependency (embracing all primary products) is 
a good measure to evaluate the impact of ‘natural resources’ on M&As in sectors not 
intensive in natural resources.  
 
For sectors intensive in natural resources, our choice for ‘natural resources’ is natural 
wealth. This variable gives a good indication of a comparative advantage in sectors 
which use these inputs intensively. Having a comparative advantage in natural resources 
is an important attracting force of M&As in sectors intensive in natural resources (see 
Brakman, Garretsen et al., 2008). The variable of natural wealth is only available for 
three years, 1995, 2000 and 2005. To overcome this problem we consider the same 
value for 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997 as of 1995. We take the same value for 1998, 
1999, 2001 and 2002 as the value from 2000. And, the same value for 2003, 2004, 2006 
and 2007 as the value from 2005. This as a good approximation, since a measure such 
as natural wealth is not expected to change significantly from one year to another. 
 
Considering the case where the dependent variable is the value of the flows, Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) propose solving a model such as the one given in equation (2) using a 
pseudo-maximum-likelihood technique (PML). Specifically, the authors suggest the 
Poisson PML, which solves the problem of inconsistency in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and additionally allows dealing with the zero values for M&As 
flows. The problem with the Poisson model is that it assumes equidispersion of the data, 
which is not a realistic assumption for most datasets. If this assumption does not hold 
the data is likely to be correlated, which would affect the standard errors estimates of 
the parameters and the model fit (Hilbe, 2007). Silva and Tenreyro take this into 
account by basing the inference on a robust covariance matrix. An alternative to deal 
with over-dispersion is to use one of the variants of the negative binomial in place of the 
Poisson. 
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For the specific case where the dependent variable is a count, there are many possible 
estimation procedures available to estimate the model (see Hilbe, 2007). If there is a 
high percentage of zero counts, the Poisson and the Negative Binomial distribution tend 
to predict less zero counts for a given mean than the observed ones. To overcome this 
problem a zero-inflated model or a hurdle15 model should be used. The difference 
between these two is that the former uses both binary and count processes to model the 
zero counts, whereas the later separates the modelling of zeros from the modelling of 
counts (Hilbe, 2007). 
 
We choose here to use the zero-inflated model because it seems more appropriate to 
modelling M&As. The reason is that it is not realistic to have a “zero barrier” that must 
be crossed in order to enter a stage of positive counts. In this scenario, once this barrier 
is crossed the possibility of having a zero flow is not observable anymore. If we look 
more carefully into the data there are, for example, years for which a certain country has 
a positive count of M&A and in other years it faces either zero or positive outcomes. 
The zero-inflated model allows modelling these types of situations. 
 
There are two varieties of the zero-inflated model: the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) and 
the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB). As we show in section 5 the model that best 
fits our data is the latter, since it takes into account two characteristics of it: over-
dispersion and excessive zero counts. 
 
Zero-inflated models are two-part models. The first part is a binary model and the 
second part a count model. The binary model can be estimated using either a probit or a 
logit. For the count model (including zeros) the Poisson (PRM) or negative binomial 
(NBRM) regression can be used. Thus, the distinct point for the zero-truncated model 
(in comparison to the hurdle model) is that the count process includes the possibility of 
a zero count. For our particular application, we can consider two groups of countries, 
one for which there is always an outcome of 0, and another for which a non-negative 
outcome can occur with a non-zero probability. Thus, in the first part of the model, by 
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 Hurdle models are also referred as zero altered models. 
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means of a logit we model in which of these two groups a particular country would 
belong. The probability of zero and of  higher than zero are given respectively by: 
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where zi are the inflated variables, which are the explanatory variables for the binary 
part of the model. The inflated variables may or not be the same as the explanatory 
variables for the count part of the model. In our framework we have no reason to 
believe that there are distinct variables explaining these two processes; therefore we 
consider them to be the same.16 
 
The star superscript in the counts ( *iy ) stands for the fact that the two groups are in 
practice unobserved. What we observe are the countries in the dataset which have a 
positive or zero counts for M&As in the years analyzed. Given this data we can estimate 
the probabilities by proceeding to the count part of the model. This part consists of 
estimating, through a negative binomial regression, the probability of each count for 
those countries which are in the group of countries with a non-zero probability of 
having a positive count (hereafter: active group). Since the group members are not 
completely observed, we have the following probabilities for the actual count of M&As: 
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where fNB is the density function of the negative binomial: 
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 An exception is the dummy for years in the estimation of the logit model. First we estimated the model 
with theses dummies included in both parts of the ZINB, but since they turned out to be highly 
insignificant in the logit model, we have run the regression again with this exclusion. Apart from that the 
inflated variables and the explanatory variables were the same in our estimation procedure. Also, this 
exclusion did not represent any significant change in terms of coefficient values and significance level. 
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with α  being the over-dispersion parameter and µ the mean.  
 
If 0α = then the model reduces to the Poisson model, where the variance is equivalent 
to the mean. In the zero-inflated model, the over-dispersion parameter is an addition 
parameter to be estimated. We anticipate in stating that for our results, the over-
dispersion parameter is always significantly higher than zero. Since the over-dispersion 
parameter is significantly positive, we should use the negative binomial count instead of 
the Poisson. We also perform the suitable tests to identify the best model for our dataset. 
The result was always the ZINB. Therefore, we restrict to presenting these results later. 
First, however, we discuss the data and draw descriptive statistics. 
 
4 The Data 
4a Overview of the dataset 
Figure 3 – Sample of countries included in the dataset. 
 
Given our interest in studying the determinants of M&As in developing countries, we 
focus on countries from Africa and Latin America. We select countries with more than 
18 
5 million inhabitants in 2000.17 This criterion restricted our sample of countries to 33 
African countries and 16 Latin American countries. This group of 49 countries is what 
we refer to as our selected group of countries. These countries are illustrated, in dark, 
under Figure 3. 
 
The database for cross-border M&As used comes from Thomson Financial Investment 
Banking (henceforth: Thomson). Thomson collects data for all M&As, providing 
detailed information, by industry, for over 220 countries. It collects data through 
investigation of news, reports, among others and in this sense provides very complete 
and updated data. For our purpose we restricted the data collection to the years between 
1988 and 2007. For years previous then 1988 Thomson focused in M&As where the 
United States was involved. Therefore not all M&As for countries other then the United 
States were incorporated in the dataset. 
 
We followed Hijzen et al. (2008) and selected the data from Thomson based on 
announced date of transaction instead of effective date. By doing so we use all the data 
related to the intention to merge or acquire a foreign firm. Because we are interested in 
the determinants of M&As from the point of view of the acquirer firms, every data that 
gives an indication of their interest to merge or acquire to a cross-border firm is a 
valuable information. Nonetheless, we excluded from our selection, the transactions 
which were marked with the followings status: “unknown”, “rumor”, “seeking buyer”, 
“discontinued rumor” and “seeking buyer withdrawn”. The reason for this exclusion is 
that first, we wanted to restrict to more reliable data.18 The second reason is that our 
focus is on the determinants of the acquirer firms to merge or acquire foreign firms, and 
not on the determinants of targets firms to accept or look for a deal.19 Given this 
criterion, we kept all data which had as status: “completed”, “intended”, “pending”, 
“partially completed”, “unconditional” and “withdraw”.20 All of these categories give an 
indication of the interest to merge or acquire a foreign firm. 
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 Data source for population size was the World Bank, WDI. 
18
  Thus the exclusion of data with status “rumor”, “discontinued rumor” or “unknown”. 
19
 Thus the exclusion of “seeking buyer” and “seeking buyer withdrawn”, which are related to the interest 
of the target firm to seek out a buyer. 
20
 For an overview of the definitions of the status of transaction refer to Thomson’s website: 
http://mergers.thomsonib.com/td/DealSearch/help/def.htm#STATC 
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Table 1 – Data description: status of M&A deals 
 Number  
# of deals 10,625 
Status completed/ partially completed 8,050 
Status pending 2,083 
Status intended 184 
Status withdrawn/ intended withdrawn 308 
 
The restriction of the dataset as described above left us with 10,625 observations for 
M&As between 1988 and 2007 when our selected group of countries is the target. The 
majority of the deals had as status completed or partially completed (75.8%), but there 
were also deals whose outcome was still pending (19.6%) and others with status 
intended (1.7%) and withdrawn or intended withdrawn (2.9%) at the date of the 
collection of the data. These data are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Figure 4 – Distribution number of M&As between target regions. 
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By grouping the countries in regions, the predominance of flows to Latin America is 
evident (see Figure 4). On average, 92% of the deals directed to Latin America and 
Africa between 1988 and 2007 were concentrated in the first region. This significant 
difference among the regions is particularly relevant for our econometric analysis, 
because it indicates that we have two important groups with structural differences, 
which will help explaining the determinants of M&As as set up by our model. 
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Figure 5 – Distribution number of M&As by target 2 digit SIC code: percentage of main 
sectors over the total. 
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When Latin America and Africa are the target countries, then their acquirer firm is 
originally from a developed country in 74% of the cases. Also, contrary to what the 
theory of FDI predicts for flows among developed and developing countries, the 
majority of the M&As deals in the period were horizontal (on a 2 digit SIC code sector 
level21), around 60% when Latin America and Africa are targets. These flows were 
concentrated around the same sectors throughout the period analyzed. 
 
To illustrate the sector concentration of M&As flows we grouped the data into a four 
years period. We analyzed the distribution of the flows for the 2 digit SIC code, taking 
the 15 sectors that have attracted more M&As into account (see Figure 5). In terms of 
number of M&As the two most important 2 digit sector for the entire period were 10 
(metal mining) and 20 (food and kindred products). Another aspect shown in the figure 
is that the sectors with a higher participation in M&As are similar in all of the five years 
groups considered. That is, it seems that both regions tend to attract M&As in the same 
sectors throughout the time. 
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 See appendix D for the 2 digit SIC sector groups. 
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Table 2. Main target sector for M&As in Latin America and Africa (1988-2007) 
  Africa Latin America 
Sector 
Rank  by 
number 
% of 
total  
Rank by 
number 
% of 
total  
10 – Metal mining 1 15 1 13 
13 – Oil & gas extraction 2 9 7 4 
73 – Business services 3 6 5 7 
20 – Food & kindred products 4 5 4 7 
28 – Chemicals & allied products 5 5 6 6 
60 – Depository institutions 6 5 8 4 
14 – Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 7 4 29 1 
48 – Communications 8 4 2 7 
32 – Stone, clay, glass & concrete product 9 3 13 2 
87 – Engineering & management services 10 3 15 2 
37 – Transportation equipment 14 2 10 2 
63 – Insurance carriers 18 2 9 3 
49 – Electric, gas & sanitary services 20 6 3 7 
Sum   71  70 
We include the 10 most important sectors in terms of number of M&As for both Africa and Latin 
America. Therefore, for each rank classification we have included in the table at least ranks from 1 to 10. 
 
Disaggregating the data by regions, this concentration pattern around a few sectors 
throughout the years is preserved for both Africa and Latin America. Moreover, the 
concentration tends to be in the same sectors for both regions. This can be seen from 
Table 2, where we show the importance of each sector by rank of number of M&As 
taking the whole period (1988-2007) into account. In order to construct the table we 
limited the sectors such that at least the 10 top sectors from each region would be 
included in the presentation. We see from the table that for the 10 most important target 
sectors in terms of number of M&As in Latin America and Africa, 7 of them are the 
same for both regions. Metal mining (sector code 10) has the highest number of M&As 
in both Africa and Latin America. For Africa this sector accounted for 15.5% of all 
deals announced, and for Latin America it represented 12.9%. Another indication of 
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concentration is that the 13 sectors presented in the table correspond to approximately 
70% of Africa’s and Latin American’s received M&As. 
 
Figure 6 –Number of M&A deals on natural resource intensive sectors for the five 
countries most active in M&As in Africa and Latin America. 
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In constructing the averages for Latin America and Africa all of the countries from our dataset were 
included and not only the specific countries illustrated in the graph. 
 
Finally, we disaggregate the data in the two big groups of industries we have used for 
the econometric model: sectors intensive in natural resources and sectors that are not 
intensive in natural resources. In appendix E we list which 2 digit SIC code were 
included in each group. Figure 6 shows that, for the five countries most active in M&As 
in Africa and the five most active in Latin America, the majority of M&As is 
concentrated in sectors not intensive in natural resources. The exception is Nigeria, 
which has always had close to 50% of the M&As in natural resource intensive sectors, 
probably due to its oil wealth. 
 
For this same selection of countries we plot under Figure 7, for four different periods, 
the sum of the number of deals in sectors intensive in natural resources and not 
intensive in natural resources, alongside with the average of the resource dependency 
measure. From this small selection of countries we see that there is not a clear pattern 
among resource dependency and number of deals, as we are not controlling for all the 
other possible determinants of M&As. Still, we find that for the countries most active in 
M&As, in particular in sectors not intensive in natural resources, (Brazil, Argentina and 
Mexico), the resource dependency measure is considerably low, always under 10% of 
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the GDP. This only gives an indication of a negative association between M&As in 
sectors not intensive in natural resources and resource dependency. In general there is, 
however, a variety of experiences. The analysis needs to take all other factors that affect 
the number of M&As to draw a conclusion in regard this association. 
 
Figure 7 –Number of M&A deals on natural resource intensive (or not) sectors for the 
five countries most active in M&As in Africa and Latin America, separated in four 
periods. 
 
Notes:  NR = natural resources; other = other sectors; RD = resource dependency. 
 
5 Results 
5a Main results 
As we already anticipated, the model that best fits our data was the ZINB model. We 
restrict to providing those results, in Tables 4 to 6. We also present the results of the 
tests that confirmed that this was the best model. The Vuong test of non-nested models 
compares the ZINB with the negative binomial regression model.22 We also give the 
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 The test statistic for the Vuong test has a standard normal distribution with a large positive value 
favoring the ZINB model and large negative value favoring the negative binomial model. 
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result of the LR test of α, the over-dispersion parameter. This test compares the ZIP and 
the ZINB models.23 For all regressions, the Vuong test supports the ZINB model over 
the NBRM, while the LR test gives strong evidence to prefer the NBRM over the PRM 
in the count part of the model. 
 
For our final model we estimated three different regressions. The first one involved the 
whole dataset without making any distinction in regard to the sectors of the M&As. The 
second one restricted to the M&As in sectors intensive in natural resources, and the 
third on sectors that are not intensive in natural resources, using the classification 
described in appendix E. These results are presented in this order in Tables 4 to 6. We 
called these three different regressions respectively as: ‘all sectors’; ‘natural resources’; 
and ‘other sectors’. 
 
The tables contain the coefficient, standard errors and significance level. For the first 
part of the model (logit), the coefficient results correspond to the chance of being in the 
group of zeros M&As (passive group). Therefore, care must be taken in reading the 
coefficient signs, since a positive (negative) coefficient means that there is a positive 
(negative) chance of being in the passive group. For the first part of the model we also 
report the percent change in odds for one standard deviation in the respective variable. 
Let the odds of being in the passive group versus on the active group be given by: 
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Suppose b is the estimated coefficient for some variable, and δ the standard deviation 
for non-dummy variables (respectively, a unit change for dummy variables). Then, the 
odds ratio is given by: 
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 The null hypothesis of the LR test is H0: α=0.  
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That is, the odds ratio represents the expected factor change in the odds of being in the 
passive group for a δ-size change in the variable in question, holding all other variables 
constant.24 Finally, the odds ratio of a positive and a negative magnitude should be 
compared by inverting one of them. The reason is that a percent change of 100(ebδ-1) 
has the same magnitude as a negative percent change of 100(1/ebδ-1) (that is, a 50 
percent decline is comparable in magnitude to a 100 percent increase). 
 
For the second part of the model (NBRM), we report 100(ebδ-1) which, similarly, 
denotes the percentage change in expected count for one standard deviation increase in 
the respective variable, holding all other variables constant. In addition, for the NBRM 
part of the model the estimated coefficients of the variables measured in natural 
logarithms can be interpreted as elasticities. 
 
Table 4 shows the results for the case where we consider all sectors together, and we 
control, among other things, for natural resource dependency. In this case, most of the 
explanatory variables were statistically significant for both the logit and the negative 
binomial estimation procedure. Looking at the results of the logit regression for the 
aggregated data, some interesting facts stand out. First, the size of the target country (as 
measured by the log of GDP) does not play a role in determining the prediction of 
country group, it is only important for those countries in the active group. However, the 
size of the acquirer country does help determining group membership (every unit 
standard deviation increase in the log of GDP of the acquirer country decreases the 
expected probability of being in the always zero group by 96.0%). In fact, this is the 
most important determinant of group membership, considering the order of magnitude 
of the results. Following this order, other factors that matter in the prediction of group 
membership are: financial openness of the acquirer country, GDP per capita of the 
acquirer country, distance between target and acquirer, degree of trade openness of the 
acquirer country, GDP per capita of the target country and trade openness of the target 
country. Comparing the two dummy variables presented in Table 4, having a common 
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 In tables 6-11 we report 100(ebδ-1), that is, the percent change in odds for a one standard deviation 
increase in the variable in question. 
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language is a more important determinant of group membership than having a past 
colonial relation, although both are significant. Figure 8 summarizes this results.25 
 
Specifically, the GDP per capita of the target, the distance between the countries, and 
the measure of trade openness of the target country all increase the chances of being in 
the group of having zero M&As. The fact that GDP per capita of the target contributes 
positively to the chance of being in the passive group can be understood if we consider 
this variable as a proxy for wage. This is an approximation done in many other 
empirical works (see di Giovani, 2005; Fingleton, 2008 and Redding and Venables, 
2004 for recent examples), and in our case can be understood as a source of comparative 
advantage which acts as an initial attractor of M&As. The GDP per capita of the 
acquirer, on the other hand, contributes negatively to the chance of being in the passive 
group, as does trade and financial openness of the acquirer country, having a common 
language and being in a past colonial relation. 
 
Figure 8 -Significant determinants of M&As, all sectors 
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 In figure 8 we include all significant variables, although the dummy variables should only be ranked 
between one another. 
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Table 4 - ZINB model for aggregated data 
“all sectors” Negative Binomial 
(Active group) 
Logit 
(Passive group) 
 coefficient % change 
expected count 
coefficient % change 
odds ratio 
Ln(GDPtarg.) 0.666 
(0.044) 
*** 191.1 0.051 
(0.130) 
 8.5 
Ln(GDPacq.) 0.426 
(0.040)
 
*** 167.3 -1.389 
(0.124) 
*** -96.0 
Ln(GDPpctarg.) 0.269 
(0.079)
 
*** 35.1 0.584 
(0.218) 
*** 92.3 
Ln(GDPpcacq.) -0.065 
(0.119) 
 -9.7 -1.034 
(0.223) 
*** -80.1 
Ln(distacq.,targ.) -0.656 
(0.059) 
*** -39.1 1.958 
(0.174) 
*** 339.4 
Resource Dep. -0.012 
(0.006) 
** -10.9 0.005 
(0.018) 
 5.1 
Transparencytarg. 0.290 
(0.027) 
*** 47.0 -0.085 
(0.075) 
 -10.7 
Trade open.targ. -0.007 
(0.002) 
*** -14.0 0.016 
(0.0060 
*** 39.7 
Financ. open.targ. 0.006 
(0.006) 
 3.7 -0.011 
(0.017) 
 -6.9 
Trade open.acq. -0.002 
(0.001) 
** -9.7 -0.018 
(0.004) 
*** -58.8 
Financ. open.acq. 0.000 
(0.000) 
 2.5 -0.022 
(0.007) 
*** -93.9 
Wave(global) 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 40.4 -0.000 
(0.000) 
 -5.0 
Com. language 0.194 
(0.106) 
* 21.4 -0.994 
(0.250) 
*** -63.0 
Colony 1.283 
(0.135) 
*** 260.7 -0.964 
(0.456) 
** -61.9 
# of observations: 75,068 # of nonzero observations: 1,932 
α = 2.350   
Vuong test of zinb versus negative binomial: z =11.83 Pr>z = 0.0000 
LR test of zip versus zinb χbar2=2452.61 Pr>χb2= 0.00 
Notes: Regression includes a constant term and dummies for regions of the acquirer countries and regions 
of the target countries. Dummies for years are also included in the NBRM. GDPpc = GDP per capita; 
distacq.,targ. = distance between acquirer and target; Resource Dep. = Resource Dependency; Trade open. = 
trade openness; Financ. open. = financial openness; Com. language = Common language; targ. = target 
country; acq. = acquirer country. % chance in expected count (odds ratio) is for standard deviation 
increase in the variables in question (exception to that is for the two dummy variables, common language 
and colony, for which we take instead the unit increase in the variable in question). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The dependent 
variable is number of cross-border M&As. 
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The interpretation of the results for the negative binomial part is more straightforward 
and all significant coefficients have the expected sign. The coefficient that we are most 
interested in is the one related to resource dependency.26 Holding everything else 
constant we found that being dependent in natural resources decreases the expected 
number of M&As towards developing countries by 10.9%.27 Thus, if we would compare 
our result with the ones found in the literature, ours would be contrary to the empirical 
findings of e.g. Onyeiwu and Shrestha, 2004 and Jensen, 2003. Our results are in line 
with the findings of Gylfason (2004) and with the theoretical literature that associates 
resource dependency with volatility and consequently lower level of FDI. Nonetheless, 
as we hypothesized before, we believe that this might not be the case for all sectors of 
M&As. Therefore we further proceeded with the disaggregation of the data. 
 
Table 5 presents the results for the M&As in sectors intensive in natural resources. In 
this case we have controlled for natural wealth, instead of natural resource dependency. 
We find that for countries in the active group, a one standard deviation on the natural 
wealth variable increases their chance of receiving M&As in sectors intensive in natural 
resources by 37.4%. This result provides support for our first hypothesis. If we would 
have used the natural resource dependency variable, then the resulting coefficient would 
not be significant (see section 5.b2). 
 
Another noteworthy point is that when making this disaggregation the impact of the 
explanatory variables is different than for the aggregated data, and also some 
coefficients become insignificant. For example, for the active group, the GDP of the 
target country is no longer a significant variable in explaining the attraction of M&As, 
whereas it was very high and significant for the whole sample of M&As (191.1%). And, 
the GDP per capita of the target country is no longer a significant determinant for both 
the active and passive group. 
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 In fact, for the wholedaset we could also control for natural wealth, since we have M&As in sectors 
intensive in natural resources. We omit the results here, for brevity of space, but we also estimated the 
same regression using the measure of natural wealth. Overall the change in coefficients and significance 
level was small, nonetheless the coefficient for natural wealth was insignificant for both parts of the 
model. 
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 (for each unit increase in the standard deviation of the resource dependency variable). 
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Table 5 - ZINB model for M&As in sectors intensive in natural resources 
“Natural 
Resources” 
Negative Binomial 
(Active group) 
Logit  
(Passive group) 
 coefficient % change 
expected count 
Coefficient % change 
odds ratio 
Ln(GDPtarg.) 0.130 
(0.15) 
 
23.0 -0.3001 
(0.549) 
 
-38.0 
Ln(GDPacq.) -0.412 
(0.091) 
*** -60.9 -4.046 
(0.584) 
*** -100.0 
Ln(GDPpctarg.) 0.281 
(0.175) 
 37.8 0.551 
(0.629) 
 87.7 
Ln(GDPpcacq.) 0.331 
(0.177) 
* 67.7 -0.742 
(0.391) 
** -68.6 
Ln(distacq.,targ.) -0.112 
(0.113) 
 -8.2 4.209 
(0.606) 
*** 2332.3 
Ln(Natural 
wealth) 
0.246 
(0.120) 
** 37.4 -0.593 
(0.460) 
 -53.5 
Transparencytarg. 0.228 
(0.050) 
*** 33.5 -0.525 
(0.181)
 
*** -48.6 
Trade open.targ. -0.006 
(0.004) 
* -14.0 0.012 
(0.011) 
 
33.8 
Financ. open.targ. 0.005 
(0.010) 
 3.8 -0.001 
(0.032) 
 -0.8 
Trade open.acq. -0.015 
(0.003) 
*** -51.6 -0.061 
(0.011) 
*** -95.1 
Financ. open.acq. 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 15.7 0.002 
(0.001) 
*** 12.8 
Wave(global) 0.000 
(0.000) 
 -13.2 -0.002 
(0.001) 
*** -42.8 
Com. language -0.374 
(0.196) 
** -31.2 -1.137 
(0.514)
 
*** -67.9 
Colony 1.453 
(0.244) 
*** 327.8 -1.662 
(1.097) 
 -81.0 
# of observations: 35,254 # of nonzero observations: 514 
α = 2.586   
Vuong test of zinb versus negative binomial: z = 10.51 Pr>z = 0.0000 
LR test of zip versus zinb χbar2=273.39 Pr>χb2= 0.00 
Notes: Regression includes a constant term and dummies for regions of the acquirer countries and regions 
of the target countries. Dummies for years are also included in the NBRM. GDPpc = GDP per capita; 
distacq.,targ. = distance between acquirer and target; Trade open. = trade openness; Financ. open. = financial 
openness; Com. language = Common language; targ. = target country; acq. = acquirer country. % chance 
in expected count (odds ratio) is for standard deviation increase in the variables in question (exception to 
that is for the two dummy variables, common language and colony, for which we take instead the unit 
increase in the variable in question). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is number of cross-border M&As. 
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Table 6 - ZINB model for M&As in sectors not intensive in natural resources 
“other sectors” Negative Binomial  
(Active group) 
Logit  
(Passive group) 
 coefficient % change 
expected count 
coefficient % change 
odds ratio 
Ln(GDPtarg.) 0.705 
(0.043) 
*** 209.9 0.118 
(0.170) 
 20.8 
Ln(GDPacq.) 0.585 
(0.039) 
*** 286.6 -1.361 
(0.136) 
*** -95.7 
Ln(GDPpctarg.) 0.413 
(0.076) 
*** 58.7 1.080 
(0.270) 
*** 234.9 
Ln(GDPpcacq.) -0.001 
(0.116) 
 -0.2 -0.807 
(0.250) 
*** -71.7 
Ln(distacq.,targ.) -0.918 
(0.061) 
*** -50.1 1.440 
(0.177) 
*** 197.0 
Resource Dep. -0.027 
(0.006) 
*** -23.9 -0.023 
(0.027) 
 -20.7 
Transparencytarg. 0.331 
(0.025) 
*** 55.3 0.116 
(0.091) 
 16.6 
Trade open.targ. -0.011 
(0.002) 
*** -21.4 0.015 
(0.007) 
** 35.9 
Financ. open.targ. 0.012 
(0.006) 
** 7.8 -0.021 
(0.022) 
 -12.5 
Trade open.acq. -0.000 
(0.001) 
 -0.3 -0.022 
(0.004) 
*** -65.8 
Financ. open.acq. -0.000 
(0.000) 
 -0.1 -0.029 
(0.008) 
*** -97.4 
Wave(global) 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 42.0 -0.001 
(0.000) 
 -14.3 
Com. language 0.502 
(0.108) 
*** 65.2 -0.779 
(0.299) 
*** -54.1 
Colony 1.146 
(0.132) 
*** 214.5 -1.581 
(0.536) 
*** -79.4 
# of observations: 37,534 # of nonzero observations: 1,362 
α = 0.824   
Vuong test of zinb versus negative binomial: z = 10.16 Pr>z = 0.0000 
LR test of zip versus zinb χbar2 =1053.4 Pr>χb2= 0.00 
Notes: Regression includes a constant term and dummies for regions of the acquirer countries and regions 
of the target countries. Dummies for years are also included in the NBRM. GDPpc = GDP per capita; 
distacq.,targ. = distance between acquirer and target; Resource Dep. = Resource Dependency; Trade open. = 
trade openness; Financ. open. = financial openness; Com. language = Common language; targ. = target 
country; acq. = acquirer country. % chance in expected count (odds ratio) is for standard deviation increase 
in the variables in question (exception to that is for the two dummy variables, common language and 
colony, for which we take instead the unit increase in the variable in question). Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is 
number of cross-border M&As. 
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Another finding is that the GDP of the acquirer has a negative coefficient in the 
negative binomial model for sectors intensive in natural resource. This can be explained 
by the fact that developing countries have a comparative advantage in goods intensive 
in natural resources, and have a relative lower GDP than the developed economies. 
Therefore, if developing countries are in the position of acquirers, they tend to be active 
in sectors intensive in natural resources. More generally, comparing all the coefficient 
results in Table 4 and 5 gives a good indication that the contributors to M&As have a 
different impact depending on the sector for which the M&A is directed. Therefore the 
disaggregation can provide important information in establishing the determinants of 
M&As. 
 
Finally, the estimation results for the M&As in sectors that are not intensive in natural 
resources are much in line with the results for the aggregated data, but the impact of 
each individual explanatory variable are in general stronger (compare Table 4 with 
Table 6). For example, for the negative binomial estimation, the GDP of the target 
increases the expected number of M&As by 209.9%, as opposed to 191.1% for the 
aggregated data, and it was insignificant for the M&As in sectors intensive in natural 
resources.  
 
Also, here we find strong evidence for our second hypothesis. Resource dependency is a 
significant factor in explaining the expected count for countries in the active group of 
M&As. The result shows that holding everything else constant, being a resource 
dependent country decreases the expected number of M&As in sectors not intensive in 
natural resources by 23.9%. 
 
5b Robustness check 
 5b1 Lag natural resources 
As a robustness check we run the same models as before (for the whole dataset and for 
the data on M&As in sectors not intensive in natural resources) but using one year lag 
for the resource dependency variable. We check then whether the coefficient on 
resource dependency, in particular, remains close to the one from our previous results 
and with similar statistical significance. One concern here is that we might have an 
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endogeneity problem. That is, it is possible that because a certain country receives more 
(less) M&As the economy becomes more (less) diversified, leading to a lower (higher) 
degree of resource dependency. 
 
We use a common method to deal with endogenous variable in a time series framework: 
lagging the endogenous variable, in our case, by one period. This is the only change we 
have done in our new estimation of the model, and the results we present in appendix E 
under Tables A.5, A.6. A comparison between Tables A.5 and 4; and A.6 and 6 shows 
that the change in coefficient estimates and significance level is very small. This 
indicates that if there is an endogeneity problem this would lead to a very small bias of 
our results, such that our analysis with our main results remains valid. 
 
In particular, the conclusion for the impact of resource dependency remains the same: 
without sector disaggregation there is a negative and significant impact of being 
resource dependent on number of M&As. Disaggregating by sectors we find that being 
resource dependent has a negative effect in M&As for sectors not intensive in natural 
resources.  
 
 5b2 Natural wealth versus resource dependency 
We defend in this paper that not only a sector disaggregation is important to understand 
the determinants of M&As, but also that the measure of “natural resources” should not 
be the same when we are considering M&As in sectors intensive and not intensive in 
natural resources. For the former, the best measure is one that indicates the comparative 
advantage in these sectors, which is, natural wealth. For the latter, we support the use of 
exports of natural resources as a percentage of GDP, because this indicates how 
dependent the country is on natural resources revenues. The higher this measure, the 
higher the instability created in the economy for a given price fluctuation. 
 
If this reasoning is correct, then natural wealth per se should not affect M&As in sectors 
not intensive in natural resources. As we have already mentioned, there are many 
examples of countries rich in natural resources that have a diversified economy, and 
therefore this should not impose a problem to attract M&As in sectors not intensive in 
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natural resources. This is indeed what we find. Table A.7 in the appendix shows the 
results when we regress the dataset on sectors not intensive in natural resources, 
controlling for natural wealth, instead of resource dependency. 
 
For the reasoning presented above to be correct, we would also need to have that 
exports of natural resources over GDP does not necessarily imply a positive impact on 
M&As in sectors intensive in natural resources, because it is not a good proxy for 
comparative advantage. In other words, there are countries with a comparative 
advantage in natural resources but who’s GDP does not depend considerably on exports 
of goods intensive in natural resources. This is exactly what we find. If we use the 
measure of natural resource dependency in the regression with the disaggregated data in 
sectors intensive in natural resources, than this variable does not have a significant 
result. In Table A.8 in the appendix we present the results for this regression. 
 
 5b3 Alternative measure for natural resource dependency 
As a final robustness check, we use an alternative measure of natural resource 
dependency: the percentage of natural wealth over total wealth, which can be easily 
determined from the unpublished estimates of natural wealth from the World Bank. 
Using this measure, which also gives an indication of the weight that natural resources 
has on the economy, reinforces our findings for the second hypothesis. Again we find 
that natural resource dependency has a negative impact in the attraction of M&As in 
sectors not intensive in natural resources (a one percent increase in the measure for 
countries in the active group decreases the expected number of M&As by 16.9%). Table 
A.9 in the appendix presents these results. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Using data from Thomson Financial Investment Banking for 49 countries from Africa 
and Latin America during the period 1988 until 2007, we estimated the effect of 
“natural resources” on the number of cross-border M&As by using a ZINB gravity type 
of model. Furthermore, we disaggregated the data into sectors intensive in natural 
resources and sectors not intensive in natural resources. We proposed and tested two 
hypothesis motivated by the resource curse literature and cross-border M&As literature. 
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Overall, we found strong support for both our hypotheses: countries with a high 
dependency on natural resources attract fewer M&As in sectors not intensive in natural 
resources; and countries with a comparative advantage in natural resources attract more 
M&As in sectors intensive in natural resources. 
 
Our research showed that there is no evidence that suggests an endogeneity problem. 
Considering the lag of the resource dependency variable we found no significant change 
to the estimated coefficients. Therefore, we concluded that our results were robust to a 
possible endogeneity bias. A suggestion for future research would be to solve the ZINB 
model for the case that an endogenous variable is present and re-estimate the model. 
Still, as we pointed out, we do not think this would significantly change the results. 
 
We also showed that the appropriate measure for “natural resources” depends on the 
target sector of M&As. In sectors intensive in natural resources, the best control 
variable is natural wealth. In sectors not intensive in natural resources, on the other 
hand, a measure of resource dependency is indicated. 
 
Our hypotheses indicate that resource dependency leads to a concentration of sectors in 
the target economy that are subject to M&As. Therefore, we expect that estimating the 
effect of resource dependency on the number of different sectors that M&As are 
directed to will contribute in understanding the impact that resource dependency has on 
M&As. In particular, we expect it to give further indication that countries with a high 
dependency on natural resources have a high sector concentration of M&As.  
 
In this paper we have partly omitted a first statistical analysis of the data, which showed 
that additional research can be done with the dataset. First, although there are a lot of 
missing data for the value of transaction, it appears to be random, and therefore using 
the value of deals as a dependent variable could be an important check for the results we 
found. Also, the same problem we solve here could be extended by taking our selected 
group of countries in the position of acquirers. The question then is whether the 
countries which are more dependent (or rich) on natural resources tend to merge or 
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acquire firms which are intensive in natural resources, and if they tend to merge or 
acquire fewer firms that are not intensive in natural resources. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A – List of countries 
Table A.1. - List of the countries included in the dataset and respective number of 
population in 2000, according to WDI/ World Bank 
Population size (millions, 2000) 
African Countries Latin American Countries 
Nigeria 124.8 Zimbabwe 12.6 Brazil 173.9 
Egypt 67.3 Niger 11.8 Mexico 98.0 
Ethiopia 64.3 Mali 11.6 Colombia 41.7 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 50.1 Malawi 11.5 Argentina 36.9 
South Africa 44.0 Burkina Faso 11.3 Peru 26.0 
Tanzania 33.8 Zambia 10.7 Venezuela 24.3 
Sudan 32.9 Senegal 10.3 Chile 15.4 
Kenya 30.7 Tunisia 9.6 Ecuador 12.3 
Algeria 30.5 Chad 8.2 Guatemala 11.2 
Morocco 28.5 Guinea 8.2 Cuba 11.1 
Uganda 24.3 Rwanda 8.0 Dominican Republic 8.7 
Ghana 19.9 Benin 7.2 Bolivia 8.3 
Mozambique 17.9 Somalia 7.0 Haiti 7.9 
Cote d'Ivoire 16.7 Burundi 6.5   
Madagascar 16.2 Togo 5.4   
Cameroon 14.9 Libya 5.3   
Angola 13.8     
Total, Africa: 775.7 Total, Latin America: 493.7 
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Appendix B – List of regions 
Table A.2. - List of the regions used in the estimation model, based on the World Bank’s 
grouping in global regions. 
Target countries regions Acquirer countries regions 
LAC Latin American and the 
Caribbean 
AAS Australasia 
MENA Middle East and North Africa EAP East Asia and Pacific 
SSA Sub-Sahara Africa ECA East Europe and Central Asia 
  LAC Latin American and the 
Caribbean 
  MENA Middle East and North Africa 
  NAM North America 
  SA South Asia 
  SSA Sub-Sahara Africa 
  WEUR Western Europe 
 
Appendix C – Data sources 
Table A.3 – Details for variables in the regression model. 
Variable Definition Source Period 
M&A flows  Thomson 
Financial 
Investment 
Banking 
1988-2006 
GDP, GDP per 
capita 
Constant 2000 US$ World Bank, WDI 1988-2006 
Distance  Simple distance (most populated 
cities, km) 
CEPII  
Common language  1 for common official or primary 
language 
CEPII  
Colony 1 for pairs ever in colonial 
relationship 
CEPII  
Resource 
dependency 
Primary commodities exports (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank, WDI 1988-2006 
Natural capital Constant 2005 US$. Comprises: 
crop, pasture land, forest(timber), 
forest(non-timber), protected 
areas, oil, natural gas, hard coal, 
soft coal and minerals 
Unpublished 
World Bank 
estimates 
1995, 2000 
and 2005 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
(CPI) 
Index of the perception of the 
degree of corruption as seen by 
business people and country 
analyst. Ranges from 10 (highly 
clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)  
Transparency 
International 
1988-1992; 
1995-2006 
Trade openness Trade (% of GDP) World Bank, WDI 1988-2006 
Financial openness Gross private capital flows (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank, WDI 1988-2005 
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Appendix D – 2 digit SIC Code 
Table A.4 – Two digit SIC code description 
Code SIC description Code SIC description 
01 Agricultural production – crops 49 Electric, gas & sanitary services 
02 Agricultural production – livestock 50 Wholesale trade-durable goods 
07 Agricultural services 51 Wholesale trade-nondurable goods 
08 Forestry 52 Building materials, hardware, garden 
supply & mobile 
09 Fishing, hunting & trapping 53 General merchandise stores 
10 Metal mining 54 Food stores 
12 Coal mining 55 Autom. dealers & gasoline stations 
13 Oil & gas extraction 56 Apparel & accessory stores 
14 Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 57 Furniture, home furn. & equip. stores 
15 General building contractors 58 Eating & drinking places 
16 Heavy construction contractors 59 Miscellaneous retail 
17 Special trade contractors 60 Depository institutions 
20 Food & kindred products 61 Nondepository credit institutions 
21 Tobacco manufactures 62 Security, commodity brokers & 
services 
22 Textile mill products 63 Insurance carriers 
23 Apparel & other textile products 64 Insurance agents, brokers & service 
24 Lumber & wood products 65 Real state 
25 Furniture & fixtures 67 Holding & other investment offices 
26 Paper & allied products 70 Lodging places 
27 Printing & publishing 72 Personal services 
28 Chemicals & allied products 73 Business services 
29 Petroleum & coal products 75 Autom. repair, services & parking 
30 Rubber & plastics products 76 Miscellaneous repair services 
31 Leather & leather products 78 Motion pictures 
32 Stone, clay, glass & concrete product 79 Amusement & recreational services 
33 Primary metal industries 80 Health services 
34 Fabricated metal products 81 Legal services 
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35 Industrial machinery & equipment 82 Educational services 
36 Electrical & electronic equipment 83 Social services 
37 Transportation equipment 84 Museums, art galleries, botanical & 
zoological garden 
38 Instruments & related products 86 Membership organizations 
39 Misc. manufacturing industries 87 Engineering & management services 
41 Local & interurban passenger transit 88 Private households 
42 Trucking & warehousing 89 Miscellaneous services 
43 Postal Service 91 Public, legislative, & general govern. 
44 Water transportation 92 Justice, public order & safety 
45 Transportation by air 93 Finance, taxation & monetary policy 
46 Pipelines, except natural gas 94 Administration of human resources 
47 Transportation services 95 Environmental quality & housing 
48 Communications 96 Administration: economic programs 
  97 National security & internat. affairs 
 
Appendix E – Selection of Natural Resource and Primary Sectors based on factor 
intensity  
2 Digit SIC code which were considered as intensive in natural resource and primary 
goods (“Natural Resource”): 
01 (Agricultural production – crops); 02 (Agricultural production – livestock); 07 
(Agricultural services); 08 (Forestry); 09 (Fishing, hunting, and trapping); 10 (Metal 
mining); 12 (Coal mining); 13 (Oil and gas extraction); 14 (Nonmetallic minerals, 
except fuel); 24 (Lumber and wood products); 25 (Furniture and fixtures); 29 
(Petroleum and coal products); 31 (Leather and leather products); 32 (Stone, clay, glass, 
and concrete products); 33 (Primary metal industries). 
 
2 Digit SIC code which were not considered as intensive in natural resource and 
primary goods (“other”): 
15 (General building contractors); 16 (Heavy construction contractors); 17 (Special 
trade contractors); 20 (Food and kindred products); 21 (Tobacco manufacturers); 22 
(Textile mill products); 23 (Apparel and other textile products); 26 (Paper and allied 
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products); 27 (Printing and publishing); 28 (Chemicals and allied products); 30 (Rubber 
and miscellaneous plastics products); 34 ( Fabricated metal products); 35 (Industrial 
machinery and equipment); 36 (Electrical machinery and equipment); 37 
(Transportation equipment); 38 (Instruments and related products); 39 (Miscellaneous 
manufacturing industries); all 2 digit SIC code under 1 digit SIC code 4 (Transportation, 
Communication, and Utilities); all 2 digit SIC code under 1 digit SIC code 5 (Wholesale 
Trade and Retail Trade); all 2 digit SIC code under 1 digit SIC code 6 (Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate); all 2 digit SIC code under 1 digit SIC code 7 and 8 (Service 
Industries); all 2 digit SIC code under 1 digit SIC code 9 (Public Administration). 
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Appendix F – Robustness check results 
Table A.5 - ZINB model for aggregated data, using one period lag for resource 
dependency 
“all sectors” Negative Binomial 
(Active group) 
Logit 
(Passive group) 
 coefficient % change 
expected count 
coefficient % change odds 
ratio 
Ln(GDPtarg.) 0.654 
(0.043) 
*** 185.1 0.001 
(0.122) 
 0.2 
Ln(GDPacq.) 0.419 
(0.040)
 
*** 163.1 -1.401 
(0.125) 
*** -96.1 
Ln(GDPpctarg.) 0.289 
(0.079)
 
*** 38.3 0.633 
(0.216) 
*** 103.5 
Ln(GDPpcacq.) -0.054 
(0.119) 
 -8.1 -0.986 
(0.225) 
*** -78.6 
Ln(distacq.,targ.) -0.662 
(0.061) 
*** -39.4 1.892 
(0.179) 
*** 317.9 
Resource Dep. 
(t-1) 
-0.014 
(0.006) 
** -12.6 0.000 
(0.018) 
 0.1 
Transparencytarg. 0.290 
(0.026) 
*** 46.2 -0.071 
(0.074) 
 -8.9 
Trade open.targ. -0.007 
(0.002) 
*** -14.4 0.015 
(0.006) 
*** 38.0 
Financ. open.targ. 0.006 
(0.006) 
 3.7 -0.015 
(0.017) 
 -9.1 
Trade open.acq. -0.002 
(0.001) 
** -9.4 -0.018 
(0.004) 
*** -58.9 
Financ. open.acq. 0.000 
(0.000) 
 2.4 -0.021 
(0.008) 
*** -93.7 
Wave(global) 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 34.2 -0.000 
(0.000) 
 -6.2 
Com. language 0.161 
(0.108) 
 17.5 -1.031 
(0.251) 
*** -64.3 
Colony 1.335 
(0.136) 
*** 280.0 -0.887 
(0.460) 
** -58.8 
# of observations: 75,032 # of nonzero observations: 1,920 
α = 2.352   
Vuong test of zinb versus negative binomial: z =11.93 Pr>z = 0.0000 
LR test of zip versus zinb χbar2=2443.61 Pr>χb2= 0.00 
Notes: Regression includes a constant term and dummies for regions of the acquirer countries and regions 
of the target countries. Dummies for years are also included in the NBRM. GDPpc = GDP per capita; 
distacq.,targ. = distance between acquirer and target; Resource Dep. = Resource Dependency; Trade open. = 
trade openness; Financ. open. = financial openness; Com. language = Common language; targ. = target 
country; acq. = acquirer country. % chance in expected count (odds ratio) is for standard deviation 
increase in the variables in question (exception to that is for the two dummy variables, common language 
and colony, for which we take instead the unit increase in the variable in question). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The dependent 
variable is number of cross-border M&As. 
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Table A.6 - ZINB model for M&As in sectors not intensive in natural resources, using 
one period lag for resource dependency  
“other sectors” Negative Binomial  
(Active group) 
Logit  
(Passive group) 
 coefficient % change 
expected count 
coefficient % change odds 
ratio 
Ln(GDPtarg.) 0.716 
(0.044) 
*** 214.7 0.200 
(0.163) 
 37.7 
Ln(GDPacq.) 0.583 
(0.040) 
*** 284.1 -1.321 
(0.140) 
*** -95.3 
Ln(GDPpctarg.) 0.418 
(0.077) 
*** 60.0 1.025 
(0.263) 
*** 216.1 
Ln(GDPpcacq.) -0.046 
(0.129) 
 -6.9 -0.885 
(0.267) 
*** -74.9 
Ln(distacq.,targ.) -0.909 
(0.063) 
*** -49.7 1.379 
(0.177) 
*** 183.6 
Resour.Dep.(t-1) -0.024 
(0.007) 
*** -20.4 0.016 
(0.026) 
 16.3 
Transparencytarg. 0.318 
(0.026) 
*** 51.7 0.035 
(0.086) 
 4.6 
Trade open.targ. -0.012 
(0.002) 
*** -21.7 0.011 
(0.007) 
* 26.2 
Financ. open.targ. 0.011 
(0.006) 
* 7.5 -0.021 
(0.022) 
 -12.5 
Trade open.acq. 0.000 
(0.001) 
 0.1 -0.021 
(0.004) 
*** -62.9 
Financ. open.acq. -0.000 
(0.000) 
 -0.0 -0.027 
(0.008) 
*** -97.1 
Wave(global) 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 38.3 -0.000 
(0.000) 
 -12.9 
Com. language 0.463 
(0.114) 
*** 58.9 -0.870 
(0.297) 
*** -58.1 
Colony 1.162 
(0.133) 
*** 219.6 -1.600 
(0.529) 
*** -79.8 
# of observations: 37,516 # of nonzero observations: 1,355 
α = 0.832   
Vuong test of zinb versus negative binomial: z = 9.94 Pr>z = 0.0000 
LR test of zip versus zinb χbar2 =1058.22 Pr>χb2= 0.000 
Notes: Regression includes a constant term and dummies for regions of the acquirer countries and regions 
of the target countries. Dummies for years are also included in the NBRM. GDPpc = GDP per capita; 
distacq.,targ. = distance between acquirer and target; Resource Dep. = Resource Dependency; Trade open. = 
trade openness; Financ. open. = financial openness; Com. language = Common language; targ. = target 
country; acq. = acquirer country. % chance in expected count (odds ratio) is for a standard deviation 
increase in the variables in question (exception to that is for the two dummy variables, common language 
and colony, for which we take instead the unit increase in the variable in question). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The dependent 
variable is number of cross-border M&As. 
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Table A.7 - ZINB model for M&As in sectors not intensive in natural resources, 
controlling for natural wealth in place of resource dependency  
“other sectors” Negative Binomial  
(Active group) 
Logit  
(Passive group) 
 coefficient % change 
expected count 
coefficient % change odds 
ratio 
Ln(GDPtarg.) 0.822 
(0.100) 
*** 269.1 -0.201 
(0.406) 
 -27.3 
Ln(GDPacq.) 0.594 
(0.042) 
*** 286.1 -1.181 
(0.136) 
*** -93.2 
Ln(GDPpctarg.) 0.419 
(0.112) 
*** 61.4 1.425 
(0.462) 
*** 409.3 
Ln(GDPpcacq.) -0.153 
(0.141) 
 -21.3 -1.321 
(0.304) 
*** -87.3 
Ln(distacq.,targ.) -0.890 
(0.066) 
*** -49.1 1.459 
(0.212) 
*** 202.4 
Ln(Natural 
wealth) 
-0.040 
(0.074) 
 
-5.0 0.303 
(0.315) 
 48.0 
Transparencytarg. 0.322 
(0.028) 
*** 50.5 
 
-0.000 
(0.092) 
 0.0 
Trade open.targ. -0.015 
(0.002) 
*** -29.0 0.023 
(0.006) 
*** 70.2 
Financ. open.targ. 0.009 
(0.006) 
 
6.2 -0.026 
(0.020) 
 -16.7 
Trade open.acq. 0.001 
(0.001) 
 3.0 -0.019 
(0.005) 
*** -60.6 
Financ. open.acq. 0.000 
(0.000) 
 5.8 0.001 
(0.001) 
 
15.9 
Wave(global) 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 17.9 0.000 
(0.000) 
 8.9 
Com. language 0.483 
(0.117) 
*** 62.1 -1.052 
(0.312) 
*** -65.1 
Colony 1.107 
(0.136) 
*** 202.5 -1.677 
(0.545) 
*** -81.3 
# of observations: 35,254 # of nonzero observations: 1,245 
α = 0.826   
Vuong test of zinb versus negative binomial: z = 9.51 Pr>z = 0.0000 
LR test of zip versus zinb χbar2 =1014.35 Pr>χb2= 0.000 
Notes: Regression includes a constant term and dummies for regions of the acquirer countries and regions 
of the target countries. Dummies for years are also included in the NBRM. GDPpc = GDP per capita; 
distacq.,targ. = distance between acquirer and target; Trade open. = trade openness; Financ. open. = financial 
openness; Com. language = Common language; targ. = target country; acq. = acquirer country. % chance 
in expected count (odds ratio) is for a standard deviation increase in the variables in question (exception 
to that is for the two dummy variables, common language and colony, for which we take instead the unit 
increase in the variable in question). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The dependent variable is number of cross-border M&As. 
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Table A.8 - ZINB model for M&As in sectors intensive in natural resources controlling 
for resource dependency in place of natural wealth 
“Natural 
Resources” 
Negative Binomial 
(Active group) 
Logit  
(Passive group) 
 coefficient % change 
expected count 
coefficient % change 
odds ratio 
Ln(GDPtarg.) 0.340 
(0.082) 
*** 72.6 -0.575 
(0.196) 
*** -60.2 
Ln(GDPacq.) -0.409 
(0.086) 
*** -61.1 -2.565 
(0.320) 
*** -99.7 
Ln(GDPpctarg.) 0.096 
(0.154) 
 11.4 0.400 
(0.390) 
 56.4 
Ln(GDPpcacq.) 0.323 
(0.189) 
* 65.8 -0.640 
(0.336) 
** -63.2 
Ln(distacq.,targ.) -0.053 
(0.116) 
 -4.0 2.844 
(0.328) 
*** 759.0 
Resource Dep. 0.003 
(0.010) 
 3.2 -0.028 
(0.024) 
 -24.5 
Transparencytarg. 0.211 
(0.050) 
*** 32.4 -0.341 
(0.135)
 
*** -36.4 
Trade open.targ. -0.004 
(0.004) 
 -8.3 0.0179 
(0.011) 
* 45.4 
Financ. open.targ. 0.009 
(0.012) 
 6.0 0.027 
(0.028) 
 2.8 
Trade open.acq. -0.015 
(0.003) 
*** -51.8 -0.039 
(0.008) 
*** -84.4 
Financ. open.acq. 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 15.0 0.001 
(0.001) 
 14.8 
Wave(global) 0.001 
(0.000) 
 23.9 -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -19.8 
Com. language -0.430 
(0.196) 
** -34.9 -0.901 
(0.033)
 
** -59.4 
Colony 1.316 
(0.250) 
*** 272.7 -0.991 
(0.928) 
 -62.9 
# of observations: 37,534 # of nonzero observations: 570 
α = 2.332   
Vuong test of zinb versus negative binomial: z = 9.44 Pr>z = 0.0000 
LR test of zip versus zinb χbar2=240.81 Pr>χb2= 0.00 
Notes: Regression includes a constant term and dummies for regions of the acquirer countries and regions 
of the target countries. Dummies for years are also included in the NBRM. GDPpc = GDP per capita; 
distacq.,targ. = distance between acquirer and target; Resource Dep. = Resource Dependency; Trade open. = 
trade openness; Financ. open. = financial openness; Com. language = Common language; targ. = target 
country; acq. = acquirer country. % chance in expected count (odds ratio) is for standard deviation 
increase in the variables in question (exception to that is for the two dummy variables, common language 
and colony, for which we take instead the unit increase in the variable in question). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The dependent 
variable is number of cross-border M&As. 
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Table A.9 - ZINB model for M&As in sectors not intensive in natural resources 
controlling for alternative measure of resource dependency 
“other sectors” Negative Binomial 
(Active group) 
Logit  
(Passive group) 
 coefficient % change 
expected count 
coefficient % change 
odds ratio 
Ln(GDPtarg.) 0.777 
(0.430) 
*** 243.9 0.085 
(0.156) 
 
14.5 
Ln(GDPacq.) 0.605 
(0.040) 
*** 295.6 -1.301 
(0.162) 
*** -94.8 
Ln(GDPpctarg.) 0.362 
(0.085) 
*** 51.2 1.064 
(0.326) 
*** 237.3 
Ln(GDPpcacq.) -0.080 
(0.141) 
 
-11.7 -1.088 
(0.323) 
*** -81.7 
Ln(distacq.,targ.) -0.917 
(0.068) 
*** -50.1 1.471 
(0.220) 
*** 205.2 
Nat. Wth. Dep. -0.003 
(0.002) 
** -16.9 -0.007 
(0.007) 
 -32.7 
Transparencytarg. 0.310 
(0.028) 
*** 48.1 -0.001 
(0.093)
 
 
-0.1 
Trade open.targ. -0.016 
(0.002) 
*** -30.9 0.019 
(0.006) 
*** 57.8 
Financ. open.targ. 0.011 
(0.006) 
* 7.9 -0.027 
(0.021) 
 -16.9 
Trade open.acq. 0.001 
(0.001) 
 
3.2 -0.019 
(0.005) 
*** -60.0 
Financ. open.acq. 0.000 
(0.000) 
 
0.1 -0.028 
(0.008) 
*** -98.1 
Wave(global) 0.001 
(0.000) 
*** 18.3 0.001 
(0.000) 
 13.1 
Com. language 0.518 
(0.118) 
*** 67.9 -1.052 
(0.327)
 
*** -65.1 
Colony 1.129 
(0.135) 
*** 209.3 -1.479 
(0.590) 
** -77.2 
# of observations: 35,254 # of nonzero observations: 1,245 
α = 0.8523   
Vuong test of zinb versus negative binomial: z = 9.85 Pr>z = 0.0000 
LR test of zip versus zinb χbar2=1031.19 Pr>χb2= 0.00 
Notes: Regression includes a constant term and dummies for regions of the acquirer countries and regions 
of the target countries. Dummies for years are also included in the NBRM. GDPpc = GDP per capita; 
distacq.,targ. = distance between acquirer and target; Nat. Wth Dep. = Natural Wealth Dependency; Trade 
open. = trade openness; Financ. open. = financial openness; Com. language = Common language; targ. = 
target country; acq. = acquirer country. % chance in expected count (odds ratio) is for standard deviation 
increase in the variables in question (exception to that is for the two dummy variables, common language 
and colony, for which we take instead the unit increase in the variable in question). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The dependent 
variable is number of cross-border M&As. 
 
